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Abstract
Humans use various social bonding methods known as social grooming,
e.g. face to face communication, greetings, phone, and social networking
sites (SNS). SNS have drastically decreased time and distance constraints
of social grooming. In this paper, I show that two types of social grooming
(elaborate social grooming and lightweight social grooming) were discov-
ered in a model constructed by thirteen communication data-sets includ-
ing face to face, SNS, and Chacma baboons. The separation of social
grooming methods is caused by a difference in the trade-off between the
number and strength of social relationships. The trade-off of elaborate
social grooming is weaker than the trade-off of lightweight social groom-
ing. On the other hand, the time and effort of elaborate methods are
higher than lightweight methods. Additionally, my model connects social
grooming behaviour and social relationship forms with these trade-offs.
By analyzing the model, I show that individuals tend to use elaborate
social grooming to reinforce a few close relationships (e.g. face to face
and Chacma baboons). In contrast, people tend to use lightweight social
grooming to maintain many weak relationships (e.g. SNS). Humans with
lightweight methods who live in significantly complex societies use various
social grooming to effectively construct social relationships.
Keywords: Social Networking Site; Primitive Communications; Modern Communications; Social
Grooming; Weak Ties; Social Relationship From
Introduction
The behaviour of constructing social relationships is called “social grooming,”
which is not limited to humans but widely observed in primates [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9]. Humans use different social grooming methods according to their strength
of social relationships [10, 9] (see also Fig. 1 on electronic supplementary mate-
rials (ESM)), e.g. primitive methods (face to face communications) and modern
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methods (E-mails and social networking sites (SNS)). Social grooming gives dif-
ferent impressions and has different effects on its recipients depending on the
time and effort involved [11]. Face to face communication and on video calls
get more satisfaction than communication in phone and text [12]. On Face-
book, personal messages give more happiness than 1-click messages (like) and
broadcast messages [13]. In other words, humans favor social grooming by elab-
orate methods (time-consuming and space constrained). Additionally, people
in a close relationship tend to do these elaborate methods [10]. Furthermore,
its positive effect in close relationships is larger than in weak social relation-
ships [13].
Humans face cognitive constraints [14] (for example, memory and processing
capacity) and time constraints (that is, time costs) in constructing and main-
taining social relationships. These time costs are not negligible, as humans
spend a fifth of their day in social grooming [15] and maintaining social rela-
tionships [16, 17]. Therefore, the mean strength of existing social relationships
has a negative correlation with the number of social relationships [18, 19, 9].
The trade-off between the number N and mean strength m of social relation-
ships on online communications (SNS, mobile phones, and SMS) is described
as C = Nma where a > 1 [9], i.e. total communication cost C obeys Nma.
C which represents the amount of investment for social relationships differs de-
pending on individuals. This suggests that social grooming behaviour depends
on the strength of social relationships and the strength of this trade-off (a).
Humans construct and maintain diverse social relationships within the con-
straints of this trade-off. These relationships provide various advantages to
them in complex societies. Close social relationships lead to mutual coopera-
tion [20, 21, 7, 8]. On the other hand, having many weak social relationships, i.e.
weak ties, help in obtaining information, which is advantageous because weak
social relationships where people rarely share knowledge often provide novel
information [22, 3, 23, 24, 25].
As a result, social relationship forms (distributions of social relationship
strengths) often show a much skewed distribution [26, 27] (distributions follow-
ing a power law [28, 29, 9]). This skewed distribution has several hierarchies
called circles. The sizes of these circles (the number of social relationships on the
inside of each circle) are 5, 15, 50, 150, 500, and 1500, respectively [26, 30]. That
is, the ratios between neighboring circles of social relationships are roughly three
irrespective of social grooming methods, e.g. face to face, phone, Facebook, and
Twitter [30].
I aim to explore how and why humans use various social grooming methods
and how those methods affect human behaviour and social relationship forms.
For this purpose, I analyze the strength of the trade-off between the number
and mean strength of social relationships as a key feature of social grooming
methods. For this analysis, I extend the model [9] for C = Nma from a > 1 to
a > 0 by introducing individuals’ strategies about the amount of social groom-
ing behaviour. This model explains not only online communication but also
offline communication. The key feature restricts social relationship forms (size
and distributions of strengths). Therefore, humans should change social groom-
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ing strategies depending on the trade-off, i.e. they tend to use several social
grooming methods for constructing various strengths of social relationships.
My model is supported by the common features of thirteen diverse commu-
nication data-sets including primitive human communication (face to face and
communication in a small community constructed by kin and friends), modern
communication (phone calls, E-mail, SNS, and communication between unre-
lated people), and non-human primate communication (Chacma baboons). The
model connects social behaviour and social relationship forms with a trade-off
between the number and mean strength of social relationships.
Data Analysis
I found two types of social grooming methods based on the trade-off between the
number and strength of social relationships (Fig. 1). One was “elaborate social
grooming,” which was face to face and by phone (Face to face (Pachur) [31]1
and Phone (Pachur) [31]2), in kin and friends (Mobile phone (friends and fam-
ily) [32]3 and Short Message Service (SMS (friends and family)) [32]4), and
Chacma baboon social grooming (Baboon group A and B) [6]5. This should be
nearer to primitive human communications than the others. That is, these com-
munications tend to bind individuals due to time and distance constraints or in
primitive groups constructed by kin and friends. Another one was “lightweight
social grooming” which was by SNS and E-mail (Twitter [33]6, 755 group
chat [9]7, 755 wall communication [9]8, Ameba Pigg [9]9, and E-mail/Letter
(Pachur) [31]10), and in relationships between unrelated people (Mobile phone
(dormitory) [34]11 and SMS (dormitory) [34]12), which has appeared in the mod-
ern age. These communications tend to unbind humans from time and distance
constraints. This tended to be used with unrelated people. Details of data-sets
noted in brackets are shown in the Data-Sets section on ESM.
Both were divided by parameter a on Ci = Nim
a
i model (Fig. 2), where a
showed strengths of the trade-off between Ni and mi, and individual i’s total
social grooming cost was Ci, Ni was i’s number of social relationships, mi was
i’s mean strength of their social relationships (mi =
∑Ni
j=1 dij/Ni), and dij was
the total number of the days on which i did social grooming to individual j
(the strength of social relationships between i and j). Ci represents i’s avail-
able social capital on each social grooming method which varied widely among
1https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.pc54g
2https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.pc54g
3http://realitycommons.media.mit.edu/realitymining4.html
4http://realitycommons.media.mit.edu/realitymining4.html
5https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.n4k6p/1
6https://archive.org/details/twitter_cikm_2010
7https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.3395956.v3
8https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.3395956.v3
9https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.3395956.v3
10https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.pc54g
11http://realitycommons.media.mit.edu/socialevolution.html
12http://realitycommons.media.mit.edu/socialevolution.html
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individuals (see Fig. 3). I estimated statistically parameter a of the data-sets
by using a regression model logN ∼ Normal(−a logm + b log u, σ), where u
was the number of days of participation for each person and σ was a standard
deviation, that is, this model assumed that a user’s total social grooming costs
were equal to the b-th power of the number of days for which they had partici-
pated in the activity (C = ub) [9]. ub was entered as a covariate to control the
usage frequency of social grooming methods. Table 1 shows the details of this
regression result. A few p-values of a were larger than 0.05, but social grooming
methods overall seem to be divided by parameter a.
a 6= 1 suggests that social grooming behaviour depends on the strength of
social relationships because a will be 1 when social grooming behaviour does
not relate to the strength of social relationships (Ci = Nimi =
∑Ni
j=1 dij).
a < 1 shows that people have stronger social relationships than when a = 1
because the effect of strong relationships (large m) to cost C is smaller than
when a = 1 (Ci = Nim
a
i <
∑Ni
j=1 dij when m > 1). In contrast, a > 1 shows
that people have weaker social relationships than when a = 1 because of the
effect of strong relationships (large m) to cost C is larger than when a = 1
(Ci = Nim
a
i >
∑Ni
j=1 dij when m > 1). I call the social grooming methods of
a > 1 (i.e. modern methods) lightweight social grooming (Fig. 2a-g) and the
methods of a < 1 (i.e. primitive methods) elaborate social grooming (Fig. 2h-
m). That is, the trade-off of elaborate social grooming between the number
and strength of social relationships is smaller than that of lightweight social
grooming. On the other hand, the time and effort of lightweight methods are
less than elaborate methods [35].
This trade-off parameter a affected human social grooming behaviour. Peo-
ple invested more time in their closer social relationships, i.e. the amount of
social grooming between individuals increased with their strength of social re-
lationships. Additionally, a changed people’s trends of social relationship con-
structions. People having limited and deep social relationships tended to do
frequent social grooming (amount of social grooming was large) when a < 1.
On the other hand, people having expanded and shallow social relationships
tended to do frequent social grooming when a > 1. I show these in the follow-
ing.
Fig. 4, 5, and the previous work [9] show that the amount of social grooming
from individual i to individual j tended to increase with the density of social
grooming wij , where wij = dij/t and t was the number of elapsed days from the
start of observation, i.e. the amount of social grooming did not depend on t. I
modeled this phenomenon as linear increase which was the simplest assumption,
that is, v(wij) = αwij+1, where v(wij) was the amount of social grooming from
individual i to individual j and α was a parameter.
This assumption and the definition of Ci = Nim
a
i suggest a relationship
between individual social relationship trends and their total amount of social
grooming. mi shows individual i’s sociality trend (mean limitation and depth
of its social relationships) by the trade-off between N and m. The total amount
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of social grooming per day to reinforce social relationships is
G(a, α;C,m) = αC(m1−a −m−a)/T, (1)
where T is the number of days of the data periods. mi = N
−1
i
∑Ni
j=1 dij(T ) =
TN−1i
∑Ni
j=1 wij based on the definition of m and w. Therefore, the total amount
of social grooming Vi is
∑Ni
j v(wij) = αmiNiT
−1+Ni. G(a, α;C,m) is acquired
by subtracting the total cost for creating social relationships (V0 = α+T ) from
Vi (see the Development of Eq. 1 section on ESM). α was decided by the follow-
ing simulation where an individual-based model was fitted to the data-sets. This
equation shows that people who have large m (i.e. limited and deep social rela-
tionships) have a large amount of social grooming when doing elaborate methods
(a < 1; the orange line in Fig. 13d). On the other hand, people who have small
m (i.e. expanded and shallow social relationships) have a large amount of social
grooming when doing lightweight methods (a > 1; the green line in Fig. 13d).
That is, G(a, α;C,m) shows that social grooming methods were used depend-
ing on the strength of social relationships (elaborate social grooming used for
strong social relationships and lightweight social grooming used for weak social
relationships). The threshold of both social grooming methods was a = 1. The
amount of social grooming for construction of new social relationships G0 does
not depend on a (G0 ' N ; see Development of Eq. 1 section on ESM for details).
a changed the peak of a total amount of social grooming G depending on
sociality trend m, nevertheless, the number of social relationships for each social
grooming method did not show clear relationships to a (Fig. 6). Additionally,
their number of social relationships which were smaller than the general number
(about 150 [36, 37]). There may be the problem for evaluating the number of
social relationships due to the differences in data gathering on the data-sets.
There may be not a difference of the number of social relationships among the
data-sets because the previous studies [36, 37] showed that the number of social
relationships did not particularly depend on social grooming methods.
a affected the ratio of very weak social relationships. Fig. 7 shows the size ra-
tio between neighboring hierarchies of social relationships, i.e. Hk/Hk+1, where
Hk is the number of social relationships when d ≥ k. That is, H1 is the number
of all social relationships, H2 is the number of social relationships excluding
relationship d = 1, and Hk with large k is the number of close relationships.
The trade-off parameter a only affected Hk/Hk+1 when k was very small. Thus,
the strength of trade-off a related only to very weak social relationships which
seemed to be the circle of acquaintances [30].
Individual-based Simulations
Model
In the previous section, I found the threshold a = 1 on social grooming behaviour
(Eq. 1). In contrast, a threshold was not observed on social relationship forms
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due to the differences of data gathering and sampling on the data-sets. In this
section, I conducted individual-based simulations to analyze changes of social
relationship forms depending on a under the same conditions.
I constructed an individual-based model to explore the effects of the trade-off
parameter a to social relationship forms based on the monotonic increasing of
v(wij) and the difference of the peak of G(a, α;Ci,mi) depending on a (Eq. 1).
That is, individual i does social grooming to individual j, the amount is pro-
portional to wij . i’s total amount of social grooming for reinforcing all social
relationships is G(a, α;Ci,mi) Additionally, I assumed the Yule–Simon pro-
cess on social grooming partner selection, because people basically do act this
way [31, 9] (see also ESM Fig. 2). In the Yule–Simon process, which is one of
the generating processes of power law distributions [38], individuals select so-
cial grooming partners in proportion to the strength of their social relationships,
that is, the individuals reinforce their strong social relationships. In the model,
individuals construct new social relationships and reinforce existing social re-
lationships, where they pay their limited resources R = G(a, α;Ci,mi) for the
reinforcement. This model is an extension of the individual-based model of the
previous study [9] in which G is introduced. The Source Code of the Individual-
based Simulations section on ESM shows a source code of this model.
I consider two types of individuals, groomers and groomees. Groomers con-
struct and reinforce social relationships using their limited resources R (that is,
time), based on these assumptions and the Yule–Simon process. I use the linear
function v(wij) = αwij + 1 as the amount of social grooming from groomer i to
groomee j as with the above section.
I conducted the following simulation for T days to construct social relation-
ships dij in simulation experiments 1 and 2. Individuals have a social relation-
ship where strength is 1 as the initial state. On each day t ∈ [1, T ], groomer
i repeats the following two-processes for its resource Ri > 0. Ri is reset to an
initial value G(a, α;Ci,mi) before each day t. Each i spends Ri reinforcing its
social relationships.
Creating new social relationships Each i creates social relationships with
strangers (groomees). The strength of a new social relationship with j (dij) is 1.
The number of new relationships obeys a probability distribution Poisson(pi),
where pi is (Ni−1)/T . Therefore, i is expected that it has Ni social relationships
until day T , because the relationship between N and a was unclear in the
previous section, the expected value of N does not depend on a and is constant.
This setting should be natural because the previous studies [39, 37] showed
independence of N from social grooming methods. Creating new relationships
does not spend R.
Reinforcing existing social relationships i also reinforces its social rela-
tionships. Each i selects a social grooming partner j depending on a probability
proportional to the strength of the social relationships between i and j, then
i adds 1 to dij (that is, the Yule–Simon process) and spends the amount of
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social grooming v(wij) from Ri (if Ri < v(wij), then i adds Ri/v(wij) to dij
and Ri becomes 0). Each i does not perform the act of social grooming more
than once with the same groomees in each day t. Therefore, selected groomees
are excluded from the selection process of a social grooming partner j on each
day t.
Simulation Experiment 1: Checking the Model Consistency
In this experiment, I confirmed a consistency between C = Nma and two as-
sumptions of social grooming behaviour (G(a, α;Ci,mi) and v(wij) = αwij+1).
Therefore, I fitted my individual-based model to the data-sets optimized by
unknown parameter α. I used actual values of the data-sets as a, T , and Ci
in each simulation, where a was the values in Fig. 2 and Table 1, T was
the period for each data-set, and C was the 75th percentile of ub. Ni was
equally divided in a logarithmic scale (N ∈ [1, T ]). Unknown parameter α
was calculated by the optimization which decreased error values of simulations
(e =
∑M
i=1{(logNi−logN ′i)2+(logmi−logm′i)2}/M), where mi = (C/Ni)(1/a),
M was the number of individuals (M = 30), and N ′i and m
′
i were calculated by
simulation results (social relationship strengths d of each individual).
Next, I calculated social relationship forms (dij) in each a by using actual
settings (T,Ci, Ni) and the optimized α, where T was the period for each data-
set, Ci was individual i’s u
b
i , and Ni was i’s number of social relationships in
each data-set.
This model fit all data-sets (Fig. 8 and Table 2). Their distributions of
social relationships dij were roughly similar to actual distributions excluding
Face to face (Pachur) (Fig. 9). Additionally, the amount of social grooming
predicted by Eq.1 with the optimized α showed a high correlation with the
actual amount of social grooming in each data-set (Table 3). That is, this
model roughly has an explanation capacity for generating the process of social
relationships, depending on human social grooming behaviour, regarding the
trade-off constraint. The difference between the simulation result and Face to
face (Pachur) data-set may have been because the approximations of this model
did not work with small a.
Simulation Experiment 2: Effects of Social Grooming Meth-
ods
In this experiment, I analyzed the effect of parameter a on the structure of social
relationships by using the model. First, I calculated error value eaα in each a
and α, where a was {0.50, 0.55, . . . , 2.00} and α was {1.00, 1.02, . . . , 3.00}. That
is, the number of combinations is 31 × 101 = 3, 131. In each simulation, T
was the period for the Twitter data-set, Ci was the 75th percentile of u
b in the
Twitter data-set, Ni was equally divided in a logarithmic scale, and M = 30.
Each eaα was calculated fifty times, i.e. there are 5, 050 results on each a. I
used α which was ranked in the lowest twenty of eaα of each a.
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Next, I calculated social relationship forms (the distributions of social re-
lationship strengths dij) in each a by using actual settings (T,Ci, Ni) and α,
where T was the period for the Twitter data-set, Ci was individual i’s u
b
i , Ni
was i’s number of social relationships in the Twitter data-set, and M was the
number of people in the Twitter data-set.
Firstly, I evaluated a power law coefficient φ as overall effects of a on social
relationship forms because social relationship forms (distributions of social re-
lationship strengths dij) follow power-law distributions [28, 29, 9]. Secondly, I
analyzed the ratio between neighboring circles of weak social relationships which
depended on a in the previous section (Fig. 7).
I found that a changed the social relationship forms φ and social behaviour
parameter α where the threshold was around a = 0.8 (Fig. 10) because a linear
regression model with the threshold at a = 0.8 was more accurate than a model
without the threshold, i.e. the former had smaller AIC than the latter. The
former is φ ∼ Normal(β1af + β2a(1 − f) + β3f + β0, σ), where f = 1 when
a ≥ 0.8 otherwise f = 0 and σ is standard deviations (AIC: −1452.6; see
Table 4). The latter is φ ∼ Normal(β1a + β0, σ) (AIC: −1400.9). That is,
the changes of a in a < 0.8 (β2) had a smaller effect on powerlaw coefficients
φ of social relationship forms than in a ≥ 0.8 (β1). This shows that strong
social relationships decreased in a ≥ 0.8 because individuals having expanded
and shallow social relationships have more of the amount of social grooming
than individuals having limited and deep social relationships (G(a, α;C,m)).
This threshold seems to be due to the threshold of G(a, α;C,m). The difference
between this threshold (a = 0.8) and the threshold of G(a, α;Ci,mi) (a = 1)
may have been because of the approximations of this model.
Additionally, α in a < 0.8 was larger than α in a ≥ 0.8 excluding a = 0.8.
Interestingly, α also drastically changed in the range of 0.8 ≤ a ≤ 1.3. That
is, individuals in a ≥ 0.8 decreased the amount of social grooming v(wij) with
close social relationships as compared to a < 0.8.
a affected the ratio of very weak social relationships. Fig. 11 shows the
size ratio between neighboring hierarchies of social relationships, i.e. Hk/Hk+1,
where Hk is the number of social relationships when d > k. That is, H1 includes
all social relationships excluding relationships of d ≤ 1 (one time interactions),
H2 is the number of social relationships excluding relationship d ≤ 2, and Hk
with large k is the number of close relationships. There is the difference of
the definition between this H and H in the Data Analysis section due to the
difference of the definition between d in this section (positive real number) and d
in the Data Analysis section (natural number). The ratio between neighboring
hierarchies of very weak social relationships H1/H2 significantly changed around
a = 0.8. On the other hand, Hk/Hk+1 on k ≥ 2 gradually increased with a. This
was due to the fact that H1 increased with the increase a and Hk when k ≥ 2
decreased with the increase a (Fig. 12). Thus, very weak social relationship
forms were especially affected by a compared with strong social relationships.
As a result, the social relationship forms were expanded and shallow in
a ≥ 0.8. This suggests that societies with lightweight social grooming had
different properties when compared to societies with elaborate social grooming.
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Discussion
I constructed a model of social relationship forms depending on human be-
haviour restricted by a trade-off between the number and strength of social re-
lationships depending on social grooming methods. This model was supported
by common features of thirteen diverse communication data-sets including prim-
itive human communication, modern communication tools, and non-human pri-
mates. By analyzing the model, I found two types of social grooming (elaborate
social grooming and lightweight social grooming). They made different social
relationship forms. This was caused by people’s social grooming behaviour
depending on the different trade-off between the number and strength of so-
cial relationships. Both methods were separated by trade-off parameter a on
C = Nma model (a < 1: elaborate social grooming, a > 1: lightweight social
grooming). This separation was due to the total amount of social grooming
G having the threshold a = 1. The model from the previous study [9] was
expanded by adding G.
People tended to use elaborate social grooming in face to face communication
and communication in small communities made up of kin and friends, i.e. the
communities should be near primitive groups. Additionally, Chacma baboons
also showed a similar trend. They tended to use this social grooming to reinforce
close social relationships. That is, elaborate social grooming is a primitive
method (i.e. a priori). This may be used in non-human primates, primitive
human societies, and close relationships of modern humans, i.e. these may not
have a qualitative difference.
On the other hand, people tended to use lightweight social grooming in SNS,
E-mail, and communication in communities made up of unrelated people, i.e.
the communities should be non-primitive groups. That is, this social grooming
is posterior. People tended to use these methods to construct many weak social
relationships. As a result, social relationship forms may have changed signifi-
cantly when people have used lightweight social grooming. Therefore, human
societies have become expanded and shallow. Fig. 13 shows the relationship
between the trade-off parameter of social grooming methods, human social be-
haviour, and social relationship forms.
Due to these differences, people use both social grooming methods depending
on the strengths of social relationships [10, 40, 41] (Fig. 1 on ESM). A typical
person who has various strengths of social relationships [26, 30] uses elaborate
social grooming (a < 1) for constructing a few close relationships and lightweight
social grooming for having many weak social relationships. This is caused by
the change of the peak of the function G around threshold a = 1.
The function G represents the total amount of social grooming to all re-
lationships depending on sociality trend m and trade-off parameter a of social
grooming. That is, individuals’ total amount of social grooming are limited, and
these limits (G(a, α;C,m)) depend on m and a. Thus, some individuals opt for
lightweight social grooming (a > 1) a consequence of the fact that they want to
have a larger network (small m and large N). In other words, two types of so-
cial grooming have emerged in consequence of social grooming strategies, which
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are how individuals distribute their limited resources by using several social
grooming methods depending on trade-off parameter a of the social grooming.
This qualitative difference between the two types of social grooming may
be caused by the number of very weak social relationships an individual wants
to create. The most affected relationships according to the difference of social
grooming methods were the ratio between a hierarchy of social relationships
including very weak social relationships and its neighboring hierarchy. On elab-
orate social grooming, the trade-off parameter a has an insignificant effect on
this ratio. In contrast, on lightweight social grooming, an increase of the trade-
off parameter a increases the ratio. Humans may have acquired lightweight
social grooming by the necessity to create many very weak social relationships
(acquaintances). It seems to have been due to the increase in the number of
accessible others or community sizes.
Some online social grooming methods (Mobile phone (friends & family),
SMS (friends & family), and Phone (Pachur)) showed a < 1. These might have
been caused by using for constructing non-weak social relationships. That is,
the subjects of Mobile phone (friends & family) and SMS (friends & family)
were members of a young family living in a residential community which was
constructed by kin and neighbors. Phone (Pachur) was used for communication
closer relationships than E-mails when people use phone and E-mails (ESM
Fig. 1). This could be achieved by comparing diverse communication data-sets
gathered by similar conditions.
Both social grooming methods also differ from a cost and effect perspective.
The trade-off of interacting in close social relationships using elaborate meth-
ods is weaker than that of lightweight methods. On the other hand, the time
and effort of lightweight methods are less than elaborate methods [35]. Social
grooming with time and effort (elaborate social grooming) is effective to con-
struct close social relationships [35, 12, 13]. Therefore, elaborate methods are
suited to maintain a few close relationships. In addition, lightweight methods
make it easier for people to have many weak social relationships [24, 42].
The two types of social grooming methods have different roles. The role
of elaborate methods should be to get cooperation from others. Humans tend
to cooperate in close friends [21, 8, 20, 43, 37, 44] because cooperators cannot
cooperate with everyone [45, 44]. The role of lightweight social grooming should
be to get information from others. Weak social relationships tend to provide
novel information [22, 3, 24].
Thus, it should be effective for people to use elaborate social grooming to
close relationships while expecting cooperation from these relationships. They
use widely lightweight social grooming in weak relationships while expecting
novel information. As a result, the number of close relationships before and
after SNS has not changed much [37]. Weak relationships after the appearance
of SNS have been maintained effectively [10, 9].
An advantage of having information would have increased with the changes
of societies. As a result, lightweight social grooming has been necessary, and
humans have had expanded and shallow social relationship forms. Humans
probably have acquired this social grooming in the immediate past. This con-
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sideration will become clearer by analyzing various data-sets, e.g. other non-
human primates, social relationship forms in various times and cultures, and
other communication systems.
The way of using both methods may also depend on people’s extrover-
sion/introversion. In general, introverts have limited deep social relationships
and extroverts have expanded shallow social relationships [46, 47]. The diversity
of the amount of social grooming C on each social grooming method suggests
that usage strategies of the two types of social grooming methods differ for
each person, e.g. introverts tend to do elaborate social grooming, in contrast,
extroverts tend to do lightweight social grooming.
Primitive humans also used lower-cost social grooming methods (e.g. gaze
grooming [1, 2] and gossip [3]) than fur cleaning in non-human primates. These
methods have evolved more for larger groups than that of non-human primates
because these grooming methods enable humans to have several social rela-
tionships and require less time and effort [48, 4]. However, my model does
not distinguish these social grooming methods from social grooming in non-
human primates; nevertheless, the model separates modern social grooming
from primitive human social grooming. This may suggest that an appearance
of lightweight social grooming significantly affects human societies nearly as
much as the changes between non-human primates and primitive humans.
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Figure 1: I found two types of social grooming (elaborate social grooming (orange) and lightweight social
grooming (green)) and social relationship forms depending on them. People and non-human primates tended
to do elaborate social grooming (e.g. face to face communication and fur cleaning in primates) with close social
relationships. This social grooming generated limited and deep societies. On the other hand, people tended
to do lightweight social grooming (e.g. SNS and E-mail) with weak social relationships. This social grooming
generated expanded and shallow societies.
Figure 2: Two types of social relationships separated by the trade-off relationships between N and m (Fig. a-g
are adapted from [9]). This figure shows logN/ logC and logm/ logC to remove the effect of covariate C from
the relationships between N and m. These were separated by parameter a on C = Nma model (see Table 1 for
details). Fig. a-g are lightweight social grooming (a > 1) and Fig. h-m are elaborate social grooming (a < 1).
The black points show user behaviour data, orange lines show the regression lines of the models when a = 1
(C = Nm), and green dashed lines show the regression lines of C = Nma models. a < 1 shows a weak trade-off
between N and m, as a result, people tended to construct a few strong social relationships. On the other hand,
a > 1 shows a strong trade-off between N and m, as a result, people tended to construct many weak social
relationships.
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Figure 3: Distributions of total social grooming cost C. There is a difference of how frequently individuals used
each social grooming method.
Figure 4: Increasing amount of social grooming per day v by strengths of social relationships d (Fig. a-h are
adapted from [9]). The definitions of an amount of social grooming are shown in Table 2 on the Data-Sets
section on ESM. The orange lines are the 25th percentile, the green dotted lines are the 50th percentile and the
blue dashed lines are the 75th percentile. These are shown for cases where the number of samples was more
than 20 (the ranges of d of Fig. e-j are short because these were smaller data-sets).
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Figure 5: The gradients of the amount of social grooming depending on social grooming density as distinct from
those depending on social grooming frequency (Fig. a-h are adapted from [9]). These figures show a comparison
of the medians of v for each social grooming density (d/t) for different periods (t is the number of elapsed
days). Each line represents entire periods (orange lines), nine-tenths of the periods (green dotted lines), and
eight-tenths of the periods (blue dashed lines). These are shown when the number of samples is more than 20
(the ranges of d of Fig. e-j are short because these were smaller data-sets).
Figure 6: The number of social relationships on each social grooming method. Points show the medians of the
number of social relationships. Error bars show ranges from 2.5 percentile to 97.5 percentile. The number of
social relationships for each social grooming method did not show clear trends between a and the number of
social relationships. This seemed to be caused by the difference in data gathering on the data-sets.
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Figure 7: Relationships between a and the size ratio between neighboring hierarchies of social relationships
(Hk/Hk+1), where Hk is the number of social relationships when d ≥ k (i.e., smaller k shows the outer
hierarchies). Fig. a shows examples of the size ratios (k = 1, 2, 3, and 10). Fig. b shows coefficient of a in
a regression model (β1 in Hk/Hk+1 Normal(β1a + β0, σ)) on each k (see ESM Table 1 for details), where
the p-values of coefficients of a of k = 1, 2 were significant (at the 5% level). That is, these ratios increased
with a only when k is small. This suggests that the trade-off parameter a mainly affected very weak social
relationships.
Figure 8: The simulation model fit the data-sets (simulation experiment 1). This shows consistency of the
model with two assumptions (v(wij) = αwij + 1 and G(a, α;C,m)). The simulations made fit the results to
the regression lines of all data-sets (that is, green and dashed lines in Fig. 2), where these fitting parameters
were α. Very good fits were observed between the simulation results (orange triangles) and the regression lines
(green lines). The parameters α of v(wij) and G(a, α;C,m) were shown in Table 2.
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Figure 9: The cumulative distributions of strengths of social relationships dij of each data-set (black points)
and a simulation result of each data-set (orange triangle points) in simulation experiment 1. The simulation
results roughly show similar trends with each data-set excluding Face to face (Pachur).
Figure 10: A change of skewed social relationship forms (power law coefficients φ on distributions of social
relationship strengths dij) around a threshold a = 0.8 (Fig. a). The black points are the mean φ in the lowest
twenty error value eaα in each a and the error bars are standard deviations of these values. The orange and
green lines are the result of the linear regression model with the threshold at a = 0.8. That is, the green line
shows the gradient of coefficients φ (β2) in a ∈ [0.5, 0.8) and the orange line shows the gradient of φ (β1) in
a ∈ [0.8, 2.0]. The gradient of φ when a ≥ 0.8 was larger than when a < 0.8, i.e. expanded and shallow social
relationship forms. That is, power law coefficients φ when a ≥ 0.8 tended to change more than when a < 0.8.
Simultaneously, α was dramatically decreased when a ≥ 0.8, i.e. individuals decreased social grooming time for
strong social relationships (Fig. b). The black points show mean α in the lowest twenty error value eaα in each
a. The error bars show their standard deviations. These values of the coefficients and α were calculated by the
individual-based simulations.
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Figure 11: The ratio between neighboring hierarchies (Hk/Hk+1). Hk is the number of social relationships
when d > k. Fig. a shows examples of the size ratios (k = 1, 2, 3, and 10). Fig. b shows coefficients of a in
a regression model (β1 in Hk/Hk+1 Normal(β1a + β0, σ)) on each k (see ESM Table 2 for details), where all
p-values of coefficients of a were significant (at the 5% level). These ratios increased with a only when k is very
small. The ratio between neighboring hierarchies of very weak social relationships H1/H2 significantly changed
around a=0.8.
22
Figure 12: Each hierarchy size depends on a. Points show the means of the number of social relationships.
Error bars show standard deviation. Hierarchy size H1 including very weak social relationships increased with
a. In contrast, hierarchy sizes Hk on k ≥ 2 decreased with a. The number of social relationships (ALL) was
approximately constant because this was determined by the settings of the simulation.
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Figure 13: The relationship between social relationship forms (Fig. a), the trade-off of social grooming methods
(Fig. b), and human social behaviour (Fig. c and d). In these figures, the orange lines show elaborate social
grooming (a < 1), the green lines show lightweight social grooming (a > 1), and the black lines are the threshold
(a = 1). Social grooming methods were separated by parameter a of trade-off relationships between the number
and strength of social relationships (Fig. b). People changed their social grooming behaviour depending on
a. The first was the gradients of an amount of social grooming from a individual to another (the gradients
of Fig. c) increased with each strength of the social relationship. The stronger the social relationships, the
greater the amount of social grooming was spent in those relationships. The gradients of lightweight social
grooming (a > 1) were lower than those of elaborate social grooming (a < 1). The second was the total amount
of social grooming to reinforce social relationships G of each individual (Fig. d). People having a few close
social relationships tended to do social grooming frequently when a < 1 (the amount of social grooming was
large). In contrast, people having many weak social relationships tended to do social grooming frequently when
a > 1. The total amount of social grooming is normalized to compare each a. These two different behaviours
depending on the trade-off changed social relationship forms (Fig. a). These figures were drawn by using the
Twitter data-set with a = 0.5 (orange), a = 1.0 (black), and a = 1.5 (green) in simulation experiment 2. The
total amount of social grooming in Fig. d is normalized to compare each a.
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Table 1: The results of the regression analysis in Fig. 2. The t-values and the p-values of a measuring the
statistical uncertainty in coefficient a are larger than 1 when a > 1 and the statistical uncertainty in coefficient
a are smaller than 1 when a < 1. The t-values and the p-values of b measuring the statistical uncertainty in
coefficient b are not equal to 0. The coefficient a was larger than 1 in lightweight social grooming methods
(Twitter, 755 group chat, 755 wall communication, Ameba Pigg, Mobile phone (dormitory), SMS (dormitory),
and E-mail/Letter (Pachur)). On the other hand, the coefficient a was smaller than 1 in elaborate social
grooming methods (Mobile phone (friends & family), SMS (friends & family), Face to face (Pachur), Phone
(Pachur), Baboon group A, and Baboon group B). Their adjusted R-squared values were very high.
Social Grooming
Method
Adjusted
R-squared Coef Estimate
Standard
Error t-value p-value
Twitter 0.990 a 1.18957 0.02326 51.15 4.4× 10−16
b 1.30935 0.00682 192.12 Less than 2.0× 10−16
755 Group chat 0.974 a 1.21423 0.00464 46.17 Less than 2.0× 10−16
b 1.26977 0.00229 553.5 Less than 2.0× 10−16
755 Wall 0.959 a 1.56214 0.00625 89.94 Less than 2.0× 10−16
communication b 1.47639 0.00277 533.2 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Ameba Pigg 0.997 a 1.09541 0.00074 128.24 Less than 2.0× 10−16
b 1.09395 0.00031 3487 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Mobile phone 0.994 a 1.07332 0.15756 0.48 3.2× 10−1
(dormitory) b 1.25628 0.04689 26.795 Less than 2.0× 10−16
SMS 0.990 a 1.24089 0.07815 3.08 3.5× 10−3
(dormitory) b 1.21949 0.02995 40.72 Less than 2.0× 10−16
E-mail/Letter 0.988 a 1.10884 0.17744 0.613 2.7× 10−1
(Pachur) b 1.14310 0.04267 26.789 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Mobile phone 0.978 a 0.93982 0.13896 0.43 3.3× 10−1
(friends & family) b 1.23703 0.04531 27.300 Less than 2.0× 10−16
SMS 0.992 a 0.87749 0.05906 2.07 2.0× 10−2
(friends & family) b 1.04883 0.02360 44.45 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Face to face 0.990 a 0.26334 0.18489 3.984 1.6× 10−4
(Pachur) b 1.02148 0.08065 12.666 5.1 2.0× 10−15
Phone 0.997 a 0.87585 0.09219 1.35 9.3× 10−2
(Pachur) b 1.07172 0.03087 34.717 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Baboon group A 0.985 a 0.95319 0.16301 0.29 3.9× 10−1
b 1.17293 0.05034 23.30 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Baboon group B 0.991 a 0.64714 0.13587 2.60 8.2× 10−3
b 1.07354 0.04763 22.539 Less than 2.0× 10−16
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Table 2: The parameters α of v(wij) and G(a, α;C,m) in Simulation Experiment 1.
Communication System α
Twitter 1.034927
755 group chat 1.206970
755 wall communication 1.131248
Ameba Pigg 0.946045
Mobile phone (dormitory) 2.734375
SMS (dormitory) 1.019287
E-mail/Letter (Pachur) 1.708984
Mobile phone (friends & family) 1.887512
SMS (friends & family) 1.562500
Face to face (Pachur) 2.148438
Phone (Pachur) 1.660156
Baboon group A 1.044464
Baboon group B 1.020813
Table 3: High correlations of logG(a, α;Ci,mi) and logGi, where Gi is a summation of i’s amount of social
grooming per day without initial social grooming with strangers, i.e. the actual amount of social grooming. α
was decided by simulation experiment 1.
Communication System Correlation p-value
Twitter 0.8399704 Less than 2.0× 10−16
755 group chat 0.7057249 Less than 2.0× 10−16
755 wall communication 0.8130153 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Ameba Pigg 0.7678780 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Mobile phone (dormitory) 0.7434336 5.0× 10−14
SMS (dormitory) 0.9079204 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Mobile phone (friends & family) 0.9749272 Less than 2.0× 10−16
SMS (friends & family) 0.9733798 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Baboon group A 0.9789251 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Baboon group B 0.9790673 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Table 4: The results of the linear regression model with the threshold at a = 0.8. This adjusted R-squared
value was 0.978.
Coefficient Estimate Standard Error t-value p-value
β1 0.87282 0.07979 10.940 Less than 2.0× 10−16
β2 0.27829 0.08032 3.465 5.68× 10−15
β3 -0.24724 0.05208 -4.747 2.56× 10−6
β0 1.55549 0.05033 30.906 Less than 2.0× 10−16
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